At the end I give a short list of some unresolved problems of exegesis.
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In conjunction with, or as a part of, his thesis that Descartes' adversary in the Rules is scholasticism whereas his opponent in the Discourse and other later works is "the skeptic," Curley makes a seemingly very strong and contro versial claim about the conception of method in the Rules and in the Discourse.
In Chapter II titled "The Methods," he announces at the outset his contention that "the method of the Discourse, and of Descartes' published writings generally, makes a significant advance over the first thoughts of the Regulae. . . " ■ (p. 22).
The advance is apparently so significant that he is prepared to distinguish two methods and, farther on in this chapter, he claims out right that the method of the (later) Discourse is "clearly... a different method" from the method of the (earlier) Rules (p. 35). This claim raises a problem about the well-known passage in Part Two of the Discourse in which Descartes states four precepts of his "true method" (Bridoux, pp. 137-138); but, before raising that problem, it is important to note that, although it is sometimes difficult in discussions of Descartes' "method" to determine whether the author is talking about what Descartes conceives his method to be or, alternatively, about what in fact or in practice his proce dure is, I do not find such an ambiguity in Curley's discus sion.
His claim seems to be unequivocally about what Des cartes conceives his method to be --about Descartes' views expressly about method or, if you will, his methodological doctrine --; namely, that the methodological doctrine stated in the Rules differs so markedly from the doctrine in the Discourse and later works that we have reason to distinguish two doctrines of method.
According to Curley, there is some continuity in the change: earlier and later, Descartes lays stress on certain ty in genuine knowledge, he has a "mathematical model" for the sciences, and he is hostile toward "formalism" and the doctrine of the syllogism (p. 35).
But he is said to reject two parts of his earlier view: that intuition or self-evi dence is a sufficient grounding of knowledge and that mathe matics is paradigmatically and unquestionably certain (pp. 35 ff.).
And the importantly new features of the later con ception of method are taken to be the program of systematic (or "hyperbolic") doubt and the proposal of clear and dis tinct perception as criterion of truth, the criterion which Descartes proposes in the third Meditation and (notoriously) attempts to justify thereafter (pp. 37-38, 43-45).
The question I want to raise about Curley's claim is quite simple.
In Part Two of the Discourse, in the passage in which Descartes states four precepts, is he referring to --perhaps providing a digest or giving some indication of --the old method or the new?
Briefly, I shall state reasons which might be given for and against both answers. In favor of the first, it can be argued that the Discourse is ostensibly an autobiographical account of Descartes' intellectual development and that Part Two is ostensibly about reflections which he made while in winter quarters in Germany, i.e., about a period in his life that we have reason to believe is the winter of 1619-1620.
Since this is long before the alleged change in Descartes' view about method, it seems that the passage containing the four p r e cepts must be about the old method, not the new.
A second reason for this answer is that there are, as Curley points out (pp. 21-22), "parallels" or "analogues" of these p re cepts in the Rules. There appear to be ancestors of the four precepts m the part of the Rules in which the pr e scriptions are not tied to any particular discipline or subject matter, namely, Rules I-VII inclusive; and it can be argued that, when Descartes states the four precepts in the Discourse, he is attempting to give some indication of that part of his early methodological doctrine which is, so to speak topic-neutral.
Two reasons of rather considerable strength can be m a r shalled against this answer.
First, it seems that we should not be taken in by the autobiographical style of the Discourse.
Indeed, Curley quotes a passage from Part Two of the Discourse which comes before the statement of the four precepts, and he takes this earlier passage to contain a distinctive feature of the new method (p. 44).
In justi fication of his procedure, he notes that there are some points "on which the Discourse cannot be accepted as history" (p. 44, n. 22); and he attributes to Descartes an inclination "to project his mature ideas into his youth and conceive his life as a unity." Second, it would be puzzling if, in a passage in which Descartes gives the appearance of divulging his vaunted method, however allus ive or incomplete the information provided may have been intended to be, there would be no reference at all to the important new features in his doctrine.
I suppose Curley might say that, although there is no reference to the dis tinctive features of the new method in this passage, they are described earlier in Part Two in the passage which he cites in connection with the new method.
But then it is not clear why, in so carefully contrived a piece of writing as the Discourse, Descartes would serve up his methodological doctrine in such a disjointed way.
Moreover, in the passage in which he states the four precepts, he seems clearly intent on giving the reader the impression that we are here at the very heart of his powerful method, at least insofar as he chooses to reveal that method in the Discourse. Why, then, would he not refer to a part or parts of his doctrine which, on Curley's account, he regards at the time of writing the Discourse as integral and very important ingredients?
The second answer that Curley might give, namely, that Descartes is describing his new method in this passage,
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E-12 could be supported by the two reasons just given against the first.
And it could be argued that in the statement of the first precept reference is indeed made to what Curley takes to be the distinctive features of the later method. The last part of the first precept is, "to include nothing more in my judgements than what was so clearly and so distinctly present in my mind that I would have no occasion for putting it in doubt" (Bridoux, p. 137, my emphasis). "What was so clearly and so distinctly present in my mind" could be taken to be the proposal of clear and distinct perception as cri terion of truth, and "no occasion for putting it in doubt" to refer to the program of metaphysical doubt. Against this answer, there are two related objections which appear to be very strong.
First, Descartes tells us in the Discourse that he made use of his method for nine years before he turned to "difficulties commonly disputed among the learned," and he clearly implies in this passage that his method can be used in mathematics and physics prephilosophically viz. before, and independently of, engaging in the process of metaphysical doubt of Discourse IV and Meditation I. If, however, we take that program to be en joined by the first rule, pre-philosophical use of the method is impossible.
Second, if we take the first p r e cept to be in some way related to the "Rule of Truth" in Meditation III, it must be noted that, in Meditation III, clear and distinct perception --or very clear and distinct perception --is proposed as a sufficient condition of truth, whereas the part of the first precept in the Discourse in which it might be supposed that there is mention of such a criterion is worded in such a way that we would have to take the criterion stated there to be the statement of a neces sary condition of accepting something as true.
Taken as the statement of a necessary condition, the rule would p r e sumably be to accept nothing unless it is clearly and dis tinctly --or perhaps very or most clearly and distinctly --perceived to be true. But this is a precept which Descartes would not have been prepared to enjoin at any time in his life.
On his view of mathematics, there are propositions which are too complex for any human being ever to perceive them clearly and distinctly to be true; yet he certainly does not wish to place these propositions out of bounds. Indeed, one of the points of the fourth rule in the Discourse is to reduce the risk involved in accepting propositions like these.
Moreover, regarding the method to be employed in physics, there is no indication whatever of an injunction against accepting propositions which are not perceived clear ly and distinctly to be true, though he does intend to exclude propositions which contain elements that are not
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clearly and distinctly perceived, viz., powers, faculties, tendencies, real qualities, substantial forms, and the like. So it seems that, in the first precept of the Discourse, Descartes is not, or is not just, proposing a variant of the "Rule of Truth" in Meditation III.
The problem posed for Curley's "two methods" thesis arises independently of that thesis if we admit with Curley (as I am prepared to do) that Descartes comes to think of his program of metaphysical doubt as part of his methodo logical doctrine and if we also attribute to him (as I think we must) the veiw that his method can be employed "pre-philosophically" in mathematics and in physics prior to, and independently of, the metaphysical doubt and sub sequent procedure of the Meditations. The views which we have to attribute to Descartes seem to be inconsistent, and the inconsistency is so very obvious that it is something of a mystery that Descartes would have failed to perceive it.
Toward solving the mystery, I am inclined to favor Williams' suggestion in his recent book on Descartes (Bern ard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry p. 33 (New York: Penguin Books, 1978)) that the first precept of the Discourse is intended to be understood in two ways. If "occasion ... for doubt" is taken to include the reasons for doubt presented in Meditation I, the rule can be applied, in Williams' terms, "radically" and followed "to its limit." But "occasion ... for doubt" can also be taken to mean reasons for doubt other than the metaphysical reasons for doubt stated in the First Meditation; and, on this construal, the rule is far less restrictive and, as Williams suggests, is the same as the admonition which we find in Regulae II to "assent only to what is perfectly known and cannot be doubted" (Bridoux, p. 39).
I am not sure that Curley would, or could consistently, accept such an interpretation.
On pp. 37-38 he does seem to be making such a suggestion. "I suggest," he writes, "that sometime around 1628 Descartes became convinced that the Regulae, though still valid at one level, did not go deeply enough into the problem of knowledge" (my emphasis). But I have not been able to reconcile this statement with Curley's claim that Descartes rejects parts of the methodo logical doctrine in the Regulae.
I shall leave the topic of method with a question for Professor Curley: what exact ly does he think Descartes intends to prescribe in the last part of his first precept in the Discourse?
2.
For key arguments in the Meditations, Curley provides "reconstructions" in which he enumerates steps and comments on ways in which these steps might be related or supported. I have questions about steps in two of these reformulations, (a) In his restatement of the skeptical argument from dream ing in Meditation I, the second step is: "(2) Sometimes I have, in dreams, experiences which I take to be of ordinary sized objects in my immediate vicinity and which are so like my most vivid waking experiences that they are not, in them selves, certainly distinguishable from waking experiences" (p. 51).
Curley makes some claims regarding this step which I have not been able to reconcile.
About the term "experi ence" which appears here, he says somewhat puzzlingly, "Though not explicit in Descartes' presentation of the argu ment, the concept of experience is crucial to the argument" (p. 52).
Acknowledging that "experience" is a technical or "quasi-technical" term, he then hastens to assure us that, in his reformulation of the argument, it is used "in a neu tral way."
By "neutral" he does not mean neutral with r e spect to the question whether a person can be said to have experiences while asleep and dreaming.
As for that question, Curley rejects what he calls "bad Malcolmian arguments," and "experience" is said to be used in such a way that a person certainly can have experiences while asleep and dreaming (pp. 55-56).
The alleged "neutrality" is something else which he explains in the following sentences:
I use "experience" in as neutral a way as possible. For me to have an experience which I take to be of a red object is for me to be in a state in which I think I see a red object.
Surely there can be no question as to whether, in this sense, experiences occur.
I am sometimes in a state in which I think I see a reT~object.
As I understand Descartes' ar gument, it involves no commitment to sense data, or any other contentious entities.
(pp. 52-53, Curley's emphasis) From this brief account of his use of "experience," it seems to follow that to say that a person has an experience of a red object in certain circumstances is simply to say that the person thinks he sees a red object, and it seems that, by "someone's thinking he sees a red object," Curley can be taken to mean that someone believes he sees a red object.
If so, then one feature of this avowedly "neutral" use of "experience" is that experiences are beliefs of a certain kind; and, since it is clear that people do have beliefs of this kind, Curley thinks that experiences in this sense of the term undoubtedly exist or occur.
Another fea ture of his allegedly neutral use of "experience" is, as he explains in the last sentence, that it does not involve a commitment to "contentious entities," such as "sense data" or the "sensing of sense data."
Since it seems that sense data, or the "sensing of sense data," might be posited as the cause of beliefs to which Curley refers, the second fea ture of his neutral use of "experience" is that no reference or commitment is involved to the "contentious entities" which, according to some philosophers, are supposed to cause and explain or having beliefs such as the beliefs we have when e.g. we think we see something red.
If this is a correct reading of the sentences in which
Curley explains his use of "experience," he cannot consis tently claim, as he goes on to claim, that Step (2) in his reformulation can be viewed as an explanation of why we are deceived or mistaken while asleep and dreaming (pp. 55, 59-60).
Substituting "belief" for "experience" in (2), we get the following sentence: "Sometimes I have, in dreams, beliefs which I take to be of ordinary-sized objects in my immediate vicinity and which are so like my most vivid w a k ing beliefs that they are not, in themsleves, certainly distinguishable from waking beliefs." Now, though the occurrence or existence of beliefs --perhaps of "vivid" in the sense of "strong" beliefs --might be a necessary con dition of our making mistakes whild asleep and dreaming, the mere occurrence or existence of such beliefs cannot be taken to constitute an explanation of our making these mistakes.
Such an explanation would have to include an account of why we have these mistaken beliefs, and it would not be enough just to say that we do have them and they are as strong as our waking beliefs. The second meaning suggested here for "experience" is, roughly, than an experience is not a belief of a certain sort but a tendency to have such a belief --a tendency, he says, which if unopposed results in belief. If we substi tute "tendency to believe" for "experience" in (2), we get what might perhaps be regarded as an explanation of our making mistakes while asleep and dreaming; namely, that, while asleep and dreaming, there exist or occur certain tendencies to believe and sometimes these tendencies are as "vivid", or powerful, as the tendencies we have while awake and hence are"in themselves" indistinguishable from such waking tendencies.
But the price that Curley would have to pay for such an explanation is quite high.
A "tendency to believe" seems to be no more nor less mysterious and con tentious an entity than a "sense datum"; and, if this is in fact what he chooses to mean by "experience", his use of that term is by no stretch of the imagination "neutral'." Hence, either "experience" is not used in the neutral way at first suggested, or step (2) in his reconstruction cannot be viewed, as Curley claims it can, as a possible explanation of mistakes made while asleep and dreaming.
(b)
In the steps enumerated in Curley's "tentative summary" of Descartes' ontological proof in the Fifth Me d i tation, the proposition "Existence is a perfection" is con spicuously absent.
It turns out that this proposition, as Curley construes Descartes' proof, is part of a "subargument" that is supposed to support one of the steps in the argument which is stated earlier and which Curley apparently takes to be the main argument for God's existence in the Fifth Me d i tation (pp. 141-143).
I say "apparently" because he prefaces the statement of that argument with the words, "Tentatively, then, we summarize the argument thus ... ."
The step in that argument which the "subargument" is supposed to support is, "(4) I perceive clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the true and immutable nature of a supremely p e r fect being" (pp. 141-142); and the subargument is said to be" But, on these pages, there
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is no use of the expression "true and immutable nature" or its Latin equivalent; nor do we find the proposition "Exis tence is perfection." On the following page, while attempt ing to answer an objection, Descartes does state an argument which bears some resemblance to the subargument Curley attributes to him:
Although it is not necessary that I should ever entertain the thought of God, nevertheless when ever it happens that I think of a first and sovereign being and, so to speak, draw this idea from the treasure house of my mind, it is necessary that I attribute to (this being) every perfection, although I do not then enumerate all of them nor attend to particular ones; and this necessity clearly suffices to make me rightly conclude, after observing that existence is a perfection, that a first and sovereign being exists....
In this passage (and nowhere else in the Fifth Meditation),
we find the proposition "Existence is a perfection"; but the conclusion of the argument in this passage is "A first and sovereign being exists" (my emphasis) and not the conclusion of Curley's subargument, i.e. "Existence belongs to the true and immutable nature of a supremely perfect being" (my emphasis) let alone the step in the initial argument which it is said to support, i.e. " I perceive clearly and distinct ly that existence belongs to the true and immutable nature of a supremely perfect being" (my emphasis). The conclusion of the argument is simply "A first and sovereign being exists."
Curley would, moreover, have some difficulty answering a question about the logical relation of the conclusion of his subargument to the proposition --let's call it "(d)" --"A supremely perfect being exists." The question is: Is (c) logically equivalent to, or does it entail, (d)?
If Curley attributes to Descartes an affirmative answer to this ques tion, then it is unclear why the subargument should be regarded as a subargument and not a proof proper of God's existence, or at any rate of the existence of a supremely perfect being.
If, on the other hand, Curley credits Descartes (as I believe he would) with the view that 
It seems that the proposition which would have to be added to (c) to get (d), namely, (e), would for Descartes have to be a necessary truth (insofar as any truth can be said to be a necessary truth for h i m ) . But it would then follow that (e) is dispensable; and hence Descartes cannot consis tently claim that (e) is a necessary truth, that (c) and (e) in conjunction entail (d), and that (c) by itself does not. The views which Curley attributes to Descartes seem to contain a pretty obvious inconsistency.
Saying this, I do not mean to claim or imply that Curley's construal of Descartes' proof is thereby refuted, but I think it is important to note that the views are inconsistent. Part of that theory is that there is something in bodies similar to (or perhaps identi cal with) the colors we sense when we perceive them, and part of her "overall reading" is that, in the Meditations, Descartes is out to undermine theories such as this one.
The first unclarity I find in her reading is with respect
to what is to count as accepting, or being committed t o , a "commonsensical world-view" --or an alternative bit of terminology that she borrows from Sellars --a "manifest (sensory) image of the world" (p. 126-127, 225).
More p a r ticularly, the unclarity is with respect to what is to count as accepting, or being committed to, the supposedly erroneous theory about color perception which is an atten dant or constituent of this "world-view" or "image." Pro fessor Wilson rightly attributes to Descartes an inferential or judgmental theory of sense perception according to which, when, for instance, the plain man sees that a lemon is yellow, he makes an inference, or forms a judgment, about the color of the object before him.
What is not clear in her account of Descartes' theory is the relation that is supposed to hold between making these particular inferences or judg ments, such as the plain man's inference or judgment that this lemon is yellow, and holding the general theory about color perception which is taken to be part of the common sensical world-view or sensory image of the world, namely, the theory that in bodies there is something similar to (or perhaps identical with) the colors we sense when we perceive them.
(a) In one place, she attributes to Descartes the view that "our habitual inferences from sensations to things are wrong" (p. 104), and the reason she assigns to him for thinking they are wrong is that we conflate a "subjective state or sensation" with a "property of a physical thing" (p. 101).
According to this account of Descartes' view, it appears that the mistaken theory about color perception is embedded in the particular everyday inferences or judgments of the plain man in such an intimate way that it would be a (conceptual, logical) impossibility for him to make precise ly these particular inferences or judgments yet not accept the general theory. Making these inferences, he would eo ipso be committed to the mistaken theory --even though-Ke may perhaps never have formulated the theory not have given any thought whatever to any problems about sense perception that have interested scientists or philosophers.
On this account, the plain man's judgments in everyday life commit him willy nilly to a false philosophical theory, and the "world-view" of which this is a part seems to be all-per vasive, at least among plain men.
(b) In another place, Wilson gives a rather different account of the relation that is supposed to held between the plain man's particular inferences and his acceptance of the philosophical theory in question.
Referring to Descartes' position on our knowledge of bodies, she speaks of the inferences we regularly make "that produce our ordinary commonsensical world-view" (p. 113, my emphasis), implying (I believe) that making the particular inferences on the one hand and accepting the theory or world-view on the other are causally related and also distinguishable and separable.
On the account suggested here, making the inferences causes us to accept the theory, and it would be at least (conceptually, logically) possible to make the inferences yet not accept the theory.
It seems that, again, acceptance of the theory would be widespread, though what, in addition to making the inferences, would consti tute accepting the theory is not on this account clear.
A second, related unclarity is with respect to what, on
Wilson's interpretation, would constitute success in the program attributed to Descartes viz. of undermining the world-view of which this theory about color perception is a part.
Would someone who has undergone the purgation of the Meditations have to stop making or at least radically alter his particular judgments e.g. the judgment he makes when he says, "This (lemon) is yellow"?
On the first account of the relation between particular judgments and philosophical theory, it appears that, in order to get rid of the mistaken theory, this is exactly what would have to be done. The reform advocated would not be, as it were, simply a trade off of philosophical theories but a thoroughgoing revision of every single judgment that a person makes on each occas ion on which he perceives the color of something.
It would not, in other words, be a revolution confined to the study F-7 but an upheaval of the countless judgments which, according to Descartes, we are inclined to make in innumerable circum stances whenever we are perceptually aware of something. On the second account of the relation of particular judgments to theory, i.e. that the former cause the latter, such an upheaval would presumably not be necessary.
Somone enlight ened by the Meditations could continue to make the same sort of perceptual inferences that he had made in his uninformed state without being committed to the erroneous theory, for now his making these judgments no longer causes him to a c cept the theory.
Other causes, presumably intensive study of the doctrine of the Meditations, would override the causes that formerly led him into this grievous error. On the one hand, simply in virtue of making his everyday inferences, say, about the color of the lemon, he accepts a certain theory; yet on the other hand, for phi l osophical reasons, he also rejects that very same theory. In short, it seems that the philosophically enlightened man necessarily believes both £ and not I wonder whether Descartes would indeed approve such a description of his aim in the Meditations. Is it correct to say or imply here that, when Descartes asserts in Meditation II that the wax is nothing other than an extended somewhat flexible and mutable, he is drawing a conclusion from his preceding discussion?
Is it his inten tion, in other words, that the reader regard his proposi tion as something which is supposed to follow from, or to have been proved by, his remarks about the wax in its change of state?
If, as Wilson suggests, we take Descartes to be stating an argument with his conclusion, we have to credit him with an extremely bad argument.
Supposing he is argu ing on the principle that nothing pertains to the wax that changes while the wax remains, he is clearly not justified in concluding that the wax is nothing other than an extend ed somewhat flexible and mutable.
In the preceding discus sion, he says, "The color (of the wax) changes" (color mutatur ..., AT VII, 30; Hr I, 154). From this it could be taken to follow that the particular, determinate colors we sense do not pertain to the wax, but it would not follow that the indeterminate quality of being colored in general, or of having some color or other, does not pertain to the wax --any more than it would follow that the inde terminate property of being extended, or of having some shape or other, does not pertain to the wax. Indeed, it is worth noting in this passage that, while Descartes says the color of the wax changes, he says that the shape of the wax is taken away or lost (figura tollitur) .
If Descartes were arguing in the manner Wilson suggests, it would seem to follow from these remarks that, though a body must have some color or other in all its states, it need not have a shape.
Professor Wilson notes a "gap" in the argument she im putes to Descartes. She says, "as far as the preceding argument goes, it (his assertion about the wax) comes out of the blue" (p. 80).
She then points out that Descartes does state an argument for such a conclusion elsewhere, namely, at Principles II, 3-4 and 11.
But why, if the alleged "argument" in the Second Meditation is so incredibly gappy that the ostensible "conclusion" appears to be a nonsequitur, should we be at all inclined to suppose that Descartes in fact states this argument in the Second Medi tation?
There is another possibility which seems far more plausible.
He prefaces his assertion about the wax with the words: "Let us attend and ... see what remains ..." (my emphasis). When he goes on to say, "nothing other than an extended somewhat flexible and mutable," it would be F-9 more charitable at any rate to take him to be reporting an intuition --an "inspection of the mind" or, in the words of one commentator, "an immediate donn/ of consciousness" (Williams, o p . c i t ., p. 222) --rather than to be drawing the conclusion of what would be an extraordinarily, indeed unbelievably bad argument.
An inadequately supported pronouncement of this kind would certainly not be unique in the Meditations.
In Medi tation I, for instance, Descartes simply tells us regarding "simple and universal matters" that "to such a class seem to belong corporeal nature in general, and its extension, the shape of extended things, also quantity or their size and number, as also place in which they exist, time through which they endure, and the like" (AT VII, 20; HR I, 146). Just as this statement appears to be an assertion which is indeed related to what comes before but is not intended to follow from the preceding discussion, so too the statement about the wax in the Second Meditation seems to be an as sertion which is certainly related to the foregoing descrip tion of the wax in its change of state but is not supposed to be proved by, or to follow from, it.
It is an assertion which is indeed related to what comes before but is not in tended to follow from the preceding discussion, so too the statement about the wax in the Second Meditation seems to be an assertion which is certainly related to the foregoing description of the wax in its chang of state but is not supposed to be proved by, or to follow from, it.
It is an assertion which Descartes thinks can be proved but which he does not attempt to prove in this place.
Furthermore, this assertion about the nature of a body is not a necessary step in the main line of argument in the Second Meditation. Descartes' concern at the end of Meditation II is to answer a possible objection, namely, that a particular body which can be sensed and imagined is more easily known than a thinking thing or mind which cannot be known in similar fashion.
To answer this objection, he need only show that, since the wax can assume an indefinite number of particular sensible qualities, it cannot, as is commonly supposed, be comprehended by way of the senses or by imagination and that some (other) faculty of the mind is required.
Moreover, to establish this point, he does not need to tell us what that faculty of the mind reveals the wax to be, though, for reasons which Professor Wilson stresses in her book, he does choose to divulge this extraneous bit of information in the Second Meditation. 
